New York's human-rights exception, Con't

This morning after reading my email from, and the comments to, yesterday evening's post -- "New York's human-rights exception" -- I must protest some rather vast misreadings and gross misinterpretations.

First, I scarcely argued against such an "exception," if that was the pragmatic step required to complete this much greater and much worthier journey. Indeed, my opening observation mirrored my acceptance: "Only the poisonous reactionaryism of organized religion could contaminate the human-rights ecstasy of NY's new law." One should note -- rather, should have noted -- that I did not philosophically disallow the contamination. I merely observed it. If coddling the parsons and priests of organized delusions is what it takes to guarantee all of New York's citizens their full citizenship, then by all means coddle away.

Second, at no time, and in no place, and certainly in no words did I advocate a state dictatorship over organized religion. The latter institution may require Kierkegaardian leaps of faith to sustain itself -- and that's perfectly fine with me, since I adore the contemplation and debate of the abstract and metaphysical -- but only a gratuitous leap of logic could have landed on the conclusion that I had advocated, or even suggested, the secular regulation of religion.

Third, it is genuinely odd that for all the indignation expressed over what I did not write, there wasn't a whisper of deliberation over what I did so clearly write: my resentment -- and the resentment of millions of other Americans, be they agnostics, atheists, or the believing but fiscally distraught -- of organized religion's exemption from taxation. This has long existed as a subject of legitimate debate: Does the Constitutional phrase of "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" necessarily mean that, say, revenue-starved municipalities are barred from taxing the profits of sprawling, locally housed corporations of a spiritual twist? I think not, but then again I'm no lawyerly Constitutional authority; yet some who are, think not as well. 

Now, do the above opinions suggest an unmistakable anti-organized-religion point of view? You bet your etymologically corrupted Bible and Augustine's epistemologically corrupted City of God they do. As one participant to the scholarly "Jesus Seminar," I believe it was, once opined, and I paraphrase only from memory: Christianity is spent. It's had 2,000 years to prove itself as a positive world force and it has failed. I would add the same holds true for Islam, Judaism, and, as earlier denoted, any other organized delusion. Until these collective mythologies go the way of Zeus, Jupiter, Baal, Molech and Osiris -- and they most assuredly will -- however, than they can, by God, render unto Caesar -- i.e., pay taxes. 

Again, does any of this mean I would have opposed the "exception" under discussion, if only the insertion of such a characteristically small-minded religious exception meant the state of New York could thereby join the modern, authentically spiritual and humane world? Of course not. Nor did I say so last night.

***

postscript: I shouldn't have to add this, but, odds are, otherwise someone would come along and express the additionally illogical objection that the above arguments are likely founded on a godless abomination. In every discussion of the merits of organized religion I've ever experienced, that rude illogic has intruded: the popular conflation of opposition to organized religion and a disbelief in some higher, universal power. So, just to clarify before any such folly takes cyberflight, I stand firmly on the first ground of opposition to man-manufactured "religion," but hold open and even largely accept the possiblity of the second.

The cultural fact that such a testament is not uncommonly required for full admission to "theological legitimacy" only indicates how intellectually oppressively organized religion has strutted throughout the course of human history. As Montaigne either did or would have observed, his cook would know as much about God as the priest, but for profoundly vague reasons, the priest is granted an irreproachable, epistemological edge. Go figure.

Comments

[Alli]

Wow. I certainly knew what you meant. Didn't think others would take it so far.

[elisabeth]

Yeah, I thought it was obvious but the clarification is brilliant and worthwhile as an argument. But I'm not a fan of organized religion or its tax-exempt status.

[Ansel M.]

Thanks for the postscript, PM. As a progressive, Obama-supporting, life-long Democrat, who also happens to be a member of an organized religion, I'd just like to clarify that not all organized religions function by the same tenets. Some more sincerely teach tolerance and love of our fellow human beings than do others. I'm in your camp when it comes to the resentment of tax exemption for "religious corporations".

[Dorothy Rissman]

It never occurred to me that your expressing your "sadness" over the "exception" clause would create such a boondoggle.

I completely resent a tax exemption for religious organizations.

[Charlieford]

PM, I apologize for the misreading, though I wonder (forgive the pedantry) if it was really "vast" or "gross"?

You did, after all, draw an implicit comparison between the New York law, and the civil rights acts of the 1960s, saying "In short, a "religious corporation" is free to discriminate. (What if the Restaurant Association of America had successfully inserted into the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that private restaurants were exempt? . . ."

Is it really that much of a misreading to assume that the author is viewing the two discriminations under view as in all essentials similar, and that he might believe that, just as the power of the state is exercised to suppress malingerers and dissenters in the one case (something most of us here are happy to see happen), that the author is at least hypothetically entertaining the attractiveness of a similar solution in the other?

As you note here, one not necessarily compelled to embrace that solution, but again, one might refuse to do so on the grounds that it's politically impractical and that it would be positively wrong, or one can assert impracticality only, while leaving unsaid whether one thinks there are deeper reasons for rejecting coercion on the part of the state as a solution.

It seems to me--whatever your intentions may be--that what you have written leans toward the second option.

If so, then we have skirted the question regarding diversity and dissent with respect to the definition of this right, and with respect to whether a same-sex couple's right to marry should over-ride the beliefs and practices of dissenting religious institutions.

And, if it is the case that the two cases of dissent/discrimination are (in their metaphysical aspects, if you will) strictly similar, it's hard to see why the state shouldn't exercise an intervening power in the one case as well as the other.

As for tax exempt status, it's a complex enough question in its own right (many religious leaders themselves disagree with it), and isn't essential to this discussion (one might disagree with it even if a religious institution IS marrying same-sex couples, eg).

Again, forgive the pedantry.

[Robert Lipscomb]

P.M. and I are at opposite ends of spirituality. Occasionally, I think he a little presumptive in his description of religion. Having said that, I have no real problem with his take on religion. Further, he has always been accomodating to me on his blog. I continue to look forward to his comments.