After assessing the left's "ascendence" in the Democratic Party, political scientist Ruy Teixeira titles his analysis, "How Not to Build a Coalition." To borrow a succincter phrase from the author's overall assessment: "It's not a pretty picture."
Teixeira identifies "five key aspects" of what the left promised in its role as a, or the, major player in Democratic politics, and what actually ensued. I shall quote each promise as briefly framed by Teixeira, and then provide a synopsis of his arguments (one of which I disagree with).
"1. Turnout, turnout, turnout!" Progressives love to tout the fresh, young, minority masses who will show up on Election Day, largely because of the far-reaching policies promulgated by the left. To some degree this works. But it comes with a significant problem: The far-reaching progressive policies thus promulgated energize the other side as much if not more so. As Teixeira notes: "2020 ... was indeed a high turnout election," however everyone’s "turnout went up, including among groups the left would have preferred stayed home." Hence Democrats took a pounding in House and state legislative races. The old axiom holds: The other side gets a vote, too.
"2. 'People of Color'!" Here, there's little more than an assumption at work: that America's nonwhite population possesses an "unshakeable loyalty to the Democratic party and loathing for the Republican party." And in 2020, that assumption took a major hit. Although the left tied virtually all its proposals to what it saw as the overriding issue of systemic racism in America, the black Democratic vote dropped by 7 points from 2016, and a whopping 16 points among Hispanics. Shockingly, "nonwhite voters contributed less to Biden’s margin over Trump" — after four years of the racist clown, mind you — "than they did to Clinton’s margin over Trump in 2016." Concludes Teixeira: "The left’s recommended approach here is clearly not paying dividends. It should be discarded."
"3. Cultural Leftism Is a Winner!" For Teixeira, this key calling card is an especially intolerable humbug. The issue is tethered to #2 — that of an "increasingly multicultural, multiracial America," which, as noted, the left sees as wholly devoted to its side. Consequently, progressives have adopted "a series of views on crime, immigration, policing, schooling, free speech and of course race and gender that are quite far from those of the median voter" — in fact, I would add, quite far from those of the average Democratic voter. What's more, Teixeira observes that "it’s not just white voters who are put off by these cultural positions — the nonwhites in whose name many of these positions are adopted are not enthusiastic about them either."
The even bigger problem is the growing trend of nationalization of political races, which, however unfairly, identifies Democrats at all electoral levels with the cultural left. Teixeira's sensible, if understated, conclusion: "The logical response of a party to unpopular cultural positions that are hurting it electorally should be to moderate those positions."
"4. The Crisis of Democracy!" Here I'm at philosophical as well as practical odds with Teixeira. He argues that what is clearly the crisis of our time — Republican assaults on American democracy — is "another key link" in the left's "theory of [their] case" for ascendence, as though progressives are somehow unique in inveighing against creeping Trumpian anocracy. "[Their] approach is being repeatedly put to the test and repeatedly failing," he writes.
Such failure is unmistakable when perusing the trends of party self-identification, which, in the past year, have undergone a swing from a 9-point Democratic advantage to a Republican advantage of 5 points. It's also generally agreed that House Democrats will lose their majority in 2022, possibly in the Senate, too. Hence, failure there has been. Yet it is Teixeira's larger argument, I believe, that fails in its internal presentation:
"Most recently, Democrats, cheered on by the left of the party, pursued a doomed attempt to push extensive voting rights bills through the Senate, accompanied by a truly astonishing level of rhetoric on how only passage of the bills could save American democracy. This was all pursued despite an abundance of evidence that most voters, including nonwhite voters, were not particularly animated by the issue and the rather embarrassing fact that the bills would actually have done little to counter the threat of election subversion, the most common target of Democratic messaging. The signal failure of the crisis of democracy issue to galvanize voters to support Democrats is another example of an issue that obsesses the Democratic left but just does not build the electoral coalition their theory says it should."
Integral to Teixeira's criticism is that the left has overemphasized threats to voting rights as opposed to the far greater threat of election subversion. This is true — sadly, bewilderingly, unmistakably true. I'm a trifle unclear on his remark that election subversion is "the most common target of Democratic messaging," however. Which Democrats? Plus, has subversion actually been the party's "most common target"? I'd say no. And that, again, can justifiably be laid at the feet of progressives' outsized, over-influential pushback against voter suppression, as Teixeira critically notes.
Where I philosophically and pragmatically disagree with Teixeira (I think?) is on the proper emphasis of election subversion in upcoming elections — if in fact (and I'm not sure it is a fact) he is including subversion as a losing issue. In a separate post, he reiterates that "the real threat is not how easy or hard it is to vote but rather in certifying the results of the voting process." Correct. Yet I'm thrown into confusion by his sweeping charge that "the signal failure of the crisis of democracy issue to galvanize voters to support Democrats is another example of an issue that obsesses the Democratic left but just does not build the electoral coalition their theory says it should."
First, this is not an issue exclusively obsessed over by the left. Nearly all Democrats and more than a few independents are obsessed by it, and rightly so. Of vaster criticality, though, is that this is a test, as they say: It's a test of the American democratic tradition at large — and therefore it is an issue that must be tested front and center, whether or not voters are ultimately "galvanized" by it.
President Lincoln faced similar tests, with no guarantee of favorable results: first, that of the sanctity of the Union; then, the evils of slavery. It was do or die. Today we gaze into the loaded barrels of Trumpism, and again, it's do or die.
"5. It’s Transformation Time!" Teixeira's fifth objection can be swiftly dispatched to familiarity. "Any reasonably clear-eyed look at the election strongly indicated that Biden was elected to get the country back to normal by containing the covid pandemic and fixing the economy," he writes. "But the need to barrel ahead with transformation was pushed consistently by the Democratic party left — pushed in fact to the point of collapse in 2021." We needn't add more about the left's delay of infrastructure, Build Back Better's mayhem, progressives' utter incomprehension of "the limitations of a narrowly divided Congress" and the now-appreciated consensus on a lost "normalcy." Some of this criticism is, for sure, hindsight. The everyday outcome, though, was that "this was a terrible look for the Democrats, making them seem out of touch with the country and ordinary voters."
Mr. Teixeira's final words: "The left’s theory of the case now lies in ruins and it is up to Democrats to come up with a theory of the case that gives them a fighting chance of staving off disaster."
Which allows me yet another shot at advancing this prudent, though vastly improbable, alternative Democratic theory, which I propose (as I must always remind readers) as a democratic socialist myself: In purple and center-right districts and states, Democratic pols would do well to position themselves as America's true conservatives; not in the sense of Reaganites or Romneyites, for heaven's sake, but in this sense of their party as singularly upholding the best of America's conservative traditions — of democracy, the rule of law, belief in truths and the virtues of constitutional intents.