This week is bringing unfortunate news from Ukraine's eastern front. Russian forces are steadily, though slowly, gaining territory and towns. Still, there is an upside. Their advances were predictable, and predicted — for the short term. The longer-term forecast, on the other hand, is encouraging.
As was written on this site last Saturday: "The Russians, with a fresh and ferocious commander, are on the ground, in possession of superior numbers as well as superior equipment — and more of it coming each day — while the West's military supplies to the Ukrainians are somewhere in the air, and maybe will make it to the right locales. Advantage, for next week, Russia."
On Sunday, however, I voiced this expectation: "Yesterday I assessed that throughout the next week, the advantage is weighted toward Russia. I see no reason to reevaluate; it will be a while before its foe is properly armed up. For the long term, though: advantage, Ukraine."
As is evident in last week's writing, Ukraine's brighter future hangs on the West's hasty shipments of heavy, offensive weaponry to the eastern front. In that, there is nothing new; outside military supplies to Ukraine have dictated the course of this war since before its beginning. Now, the timing of those shipments — with the proper contents — is more critical than ever. A veritable army of analysts had urged the U.S. and its NATO allies to initiate and expedite supplies of offensive equipment much sooner. Today there is no longer a need for convincing Western leaders. Ukraine's future is inextricable from the West's swift logistical efforts.
As was also rather easily foreseen — except by blinkered, retired military brass (such as this guy) windbagging their way through cable-news interviews — the presence of Russia's new supreme commander in Ukraine, Gen. Aleksandr Dvornikov, has made a notable difference in Russia's performance on the ground. The difference is improvement. Having learned from his troops' catastrophic forays into northern Ukraine, Dvornikov is plodding ahead methodically. We see no quick, deep thrusts into enemy territory, stretching supply lines and permitting the Ukrainian Army's encirclements. These fresh tactics may seem elementary and obvious, nevertheless they required the intervention of the experienced Gen. Dvornikov's command.
What also seems obvious is that Dvornikov has read Gen. Erwin Rommel. Last night I was reading what's considered his masterpiece of military literature, Infantry Attacks. Hitler read it and was impressed, which contributed to his promotions of Rommel, who in 1937 — the book's year of publication — was a lieutenant colonel. In 1943 the U.S. military made the work required reading for officers. (I also have Rommel's unfinished sequel, "Tank Attacks" — unfinished because of a rather inauspicious case of involuntary suicide after the failed, 1944 plot to kill Hitler.) I have never been a military enthusiast. Yet military history is inextricable from political history, my field of professional study. As such, I wanted to be better informed about military tactics. Hence my reading of Rommel's Infantry Attacks.
Some of the action in Rommel's opening chapters entails 1914 warfare in French territory quite similar to that of Ukraine's Donbas: The ground is open, flat, and rare is the occasion for a soldier's concealment. Rommel was a lieutenant and platoon commander in the German army in 1914. Two decades later he wrote of his involvement in a German attack that "had to be carried out over terrain that was two miles in width and offered little or no cover." Rommel recalled that one German battalion "quickly took cover in the potato field and found protection from this fire by digging with their spades. They had no casualties in spite of the heavy day-long artillery bombardment." A reserve company, however, advanced, which "led to heavy casualties from enemy artillery fire. This teaches us again that no massing together is permissible within enemy artillery range." Rommel also advised that if soldiers "lose their nerve and break for cover" wherever it might be found, "the commander must take vigorous action, using his personal weapons if necessary."
Russia's Gen. Dvornikov is conspicuously following the tactical understanding of Rommel & Battalion in France. On not dissimilar ground in the Donbas, he is digging in, protecting his troops from artillery fire and advancing only with due caution. And should some of his men "lose their nerve and break for cover" during advances, I suspect Dvornikov is also following Rommel's command advice of inspiring gallantry among his troops by shooting the (smart) cowards who advance backward. Actually, Dvornikov had no need for Rommel's advice about battlefield inspiration, for he would have already known that in the Second World War, Red Army commanders routinely shot any man seen running in the wrong direction.
Even the usually optimistic Institute for the Study of War has turned a bit gloomy. Its recent campaign assessment of Russian forces is that they "have adopted a sounder pattern of operational movement in eastern Ukraine."
Russia's new and sounder pattern is unlikely to succeed for long, however, given that its military leadership will be unable to effect much change in the steady depletion of its redeployed troops, its daily consumption of limited resources, and a nagging lack of morale among the men it must rely on.
But for Ukraine, its war is still the West's war. Ukraine's success depends on the speedy delivery of Western supplies of advanced anti-aircraft systems, tanks, heavy artillery and other offensive weapons. Up-close Javelins will do little good in open-field combat. The eastern front portends mostly a long-range battle — the killing of men from considerable distances. Only the West can supply Ukraine with such battle-winning goods. One hopes that far more of them arrive soon. If so — and there is abundant reason to believe it is so — Ukraine will begin turning the situation around.