Retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Foggo and Benjamin Mainardi, an analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy, have written a fascinating piece on the sea war between Russia and Ukraine. They acknowledge that this particular contest has been underplayed by the press in favor of covering land operations, but go on to explain how essential the waters are to Ukraine and indeed the world, "particularly for their post-war implications."
Russia, in violation of a years-old Russo-Ukrainian treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, they note, closed to foreign ships the Sea of Azov and the waters around the Crimean Peninsula throughout part of 2021. Russia brought into the Black Sea six amphibious landing ships and then, five days before its invasion of Ukraine, held a training exercise with 30 warships. In late February its fleet landed thousands of naval infantry south of Mariupol, a city Russia has of course bombarded from the Azov Sea ever since. The invader, write Foggo and Mainardi, "virtually achieved command of the sea by default."
Russia established a de facto blockade of Ukraine on Day One of the invasion, preventing commercial traffic from entering the Sea of Azov as well as severing Ukraine's access to the Black Sea, crippling its export trade and depriving the world of its grain and other food products. Russia's sea dominance, though precarious, has also been a menace to neutral countries. Their commercial ships are strandeed in Ukrainian ports, sea mines have drifted into Romanian and Turkish waters, and some mines have reportedly struck commercial traffic in the Danube River.
Ukraine's sinking of the Moskva in the Black Sea, say the authors, "may not be as significant as some observers suggest." They venture that Ukraine will probably be unable to "meaningfully capitalize on the event," that being the breaking of Russia's blockade. Ukraine's coastline, largely dominated by the aggressor, will continue to paralyze Ukraine's sea access and maintain Russia's naval power in the Black Sea. "The blockade continues to throttle Ukraine," write Foggo and Mainardi. They are not without hope, however. If Ukraine, through missile strikes, can whittle down Russia's fleet, the latter's attrition may become too great to sustain a blockade.
The writers' overall assessment is something of a worst-case scenario. They fear that some Western analysts may be right: those analysts who foresee a distant armistice in which the Russians are permitted control of whatever territorial gains they have made. "Putin will still have achieved some notable triumphs, albeit at a greater cost than he hoped."
Critically, Russia has thus far effectively forged a land corridor from Crimea and on through to the Sea of Azov. If allowed ownership of these gains, the authors assert that Russia will have "solidified" itself as "the dominant force in the northern half of the Black Sea, if not the whole region." Ukraine would be afflicted by the loss of "the vast majority of its coastline, major ports, and (possibly) its domestic shipbuilding industry, jeopardizing the country’s long-term economic vitality and security," write Foggo and Mainardi.
I don't interpret their assessments as inherently pessimistic. Their piece is only a warning to the world as to the consequences of a partial Russian victory and thus an armistice favorable, in large part, to the Kremlin. I don't envision either one, and neither do increasing numbers of professional military analysts. In fact we can't envision that, given Ukraine's steady accumulation of advanced weaponry from the West. Moreover, if Russia's Black Sea Fleet has shown itself to be incompetent, which it has, its ground forces have shown themselves to be absolute, irremediable bunglers.
Sure, the sea war is important. But let's face this looming, everywhere fact: Russia is sunk.