Former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul asks, "Are we seeing the beginning of the end of Putinism?" The suffix is more significant than its proper noun, for if the latter were abruptly removed, a like-minded hardcore nationalist would only step into his place. Russia's more distant trajectory is McFaul's targeted question.
But first, Putin himself must demonstrate that his authoritarian, warmongering style of governance is out of sync with the long-term interests of Russia — i.e., the Russian people. And so far, he's been doing a bang-up job of it.
Consider this contrast. Why did FDR keep Gen. Dwight Eisenhower as his Allied Commander in Europe? Simple. Because we were winning. President Putin, however, just 17 days ago canned Gen. Sergei Surovikin, who held his job as commander in Ukraine for a mere three months. "The only reasonable conclusion," notes McFaul, is that "Putin understands that Russia is losing."
There are other signs of essence-grasping, if you will. For the first time in 10 years, Putin canceled his year-end news conference, undoubtedly troubled by the prospect of aggressive questions about Ukraine from Russia's otherwise complacent press corps. McFaul also notes his "subdued appearance" at a Moscow cathedral on Orthodox Christmas. And his erstwhile mouthpieces — those rowdy propagandists of recent yore — "sound depressed," observes McFaul.
One, Sergei Markov, summarized the Year of Putin's Unhelpful Lord thusly: "The USA was the main winner.... Especially Biden." A prominent newspaper reporter said on a talk show that Russia's — rather, Putin's — "special military operation" has failed in achieving any of its goals, as initially announced. And a former Putin adviser, Sergei Glazyev, said in public that Russia has neither a clear objective, a sound ideology, nor the resources to win a war against the West. (The last being Nazi Germany's rolling downfall.)
Ambassador McFaul expects Putin to hang on — but not as an "all-powerful and all-knowing leader," because he'll never recover from his monumental miscalculations in Ukraine.
About that — Putin's hanging on, that is — I'm not as convinced as McFaul. I'm no professional Kremlinologist, but some familiarity with Russian history and a few intestinal instincts suggest to me that the Federation's president could go down much as the USSR's premier did in 1964 — not, however, as is popularly thought, because John Kennedy embarrassed Nikita Khrushchev in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Foreign affairs had little to do with Khrushchev's removal. Instead, the peasant-as-premier had increasingly gotten on his colleagues' nerves. Khrushchev had a habit of being stubborn, arbitrary and singularly disagreeable in his governing style. He had also constructed a massive bureaucracy accountable to him only, rendering party members and the party itself less influential. As well, Khrushchev fancied himself a crackerjack agriculturalist, which had the unfortunate effect of catapulting Russia into a domestic crisis of food shortages.
These factors — these homegrown factors — combined and conspired against Khrushchev, leaving Leonid Brezhnev to lead a quiet palace coup. No gaudy stabbing, no unseemly, late-night firing squad, not even a primetime show trial. The conspirators just shipped the old boy off to a rustic retirement. (Slow sinks, more lovely ere his race be [further] run / Along [Khrushchev's] hills the setting sun — Lord Byron)
Now Vladimir is behaving as a Nikita2. He has incurred Western wrath, resulting in sanctions, thus displeasing the homefolk — and their displeasure is going to become much, much more intense. He's been ruling as a one-man party — stubbornly, arbitrarily and rather disagreeably. His puppetry may extend downward to the vast Russian bureaucracy, but laterally it is pissing off the Kremlineers. All which could lead to a quiet palace coup (assuming there is someone in Moscow's upper circles as stealthy and wily as Mr. Brezhnev.)
Furthermore, Putin's troubles, unlike Khrushchev's, are directly tethered to his foreign affairs, which are in a bloodbath of shambolic blundering. It wasn't enough for Putin to botch things on the homefront in this way or that; he had to double down on maladministration by remaking Ukraine as a martyr state and ostracizing Russia. And now it's quite unlikely that he'll ever see military victory on Ukraine's battlefields.
Last, writes McFaul, "Putin’s societal support is soft and declining." I happened to read McFaul's dubious assertion just before stumbling on this retweet by commentator Max Boot. After which, one must strike any future references to the dubiousness of Putin's "declining" societal support. For this is earthshaking:
Wow. 4 Moscow residents said *on camera* that they basically welcome the tanks because it will help Ukraine and help end the war. A brave thing to do! Suggests there is less support for the war than Putin pretends. https://t.co/0RiVakksZ0
— Max Boot 🇺🇦🇺🇸 (@MaxBoot) January 28, 2023
Those courageous, videoed souls — each of them willing to risk 15 years in prison for high-fiving Ukraine's new tanks rather than watching more young Russian men go to their deaths — are the most powerful testament yet not only to Putin's softening public support, but to his forehead-stamped expiration date.
McFaul concludes with: "The most likely scenario is Putin will remain in control for the near future, albeit discredited and diminished.... [But] even if the process of unwinding begins in earnest only once he is out of power, Putin’s colossal failure in Ukraine could well be the beginning of the end of Putinism."
My emphasis. Because for global peace and a sustained world order, it's Putinism more than Putin that has to go, just as Trumpism in the United States is more poisonous than Trump himself.