Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe, has some advice for Ukraine — and it's unlike what Washington is encouraging.
Don't negotiate with Russia, says Hodges. That "would be a huge mistake." His initial reasoning, as laid out in an Economist op-ed, is that Ukrainian forces have stayed strong, they possess high morale and they "have defended their homeland more successfully than most thought possible."
Washington's contrary thinking is that Ukraine has suffered the loss of thousands of innocent civilians and has witnessed the awful destruction of its towns and cities under the relentless assault of Russian missiles and airstrikes. So better for Ukraine to negotiate, says Washington, putting an end to the carnage. The more sensible argument, however, is that because of Russia's remorseless slaughter, Ukraine should refuse to negotiate — especially since its forces have remained strong.
Sitting down with the Russians would, in fact, "be foolish," says Hodges, mixing no words. The American general notes that Russia mustn't be rewarded for having violated international law and its "rules-based order," which a negotiated peace would offer Vladimir Putin. Hodges omits from his argument one other reason for avoiding talks, which to me seems a principal one: Throughout any negotiated peace in Ukraine, Putin would work to rebuild his military — and eventually stage another invasion. Ukraine is one bone the autocratic Russian cur is not about to let go of.
For Lt. Gen. Hodges, "the most important reason why Ukraine should not negotiate with Russia is that it may now have a chance to win back Crimea." And he makes a powerful argument for the attempt after first explaining not its advisability, but its necessity.
Crimea "is the most crucial piece of territory Russia seized in 2014," writes Hodges, "and it will prove the decisive terrain of this war." The peninsula is home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet, it's a logistics hub for its forces in Ukraine, and from it Russia can launch drones and other weapons. Moreover, as long as Russia has Crimea, "Ukraine cannot rebuild its economy." See: Black Sea Fleet and its interference with Ukraine's shipping from ports such as Odessa, as well as Russia's ability to block Ukraine's access to the Sea of Azov.
Hence Crimea is vital to Ukraine's national welfare, whether in a state of negotiated settlement or not. Show of hands: How many believe Putin would cease harassing Ukraine's commercial shipping during "peace"? Or resist rebuilding his manpower and weapons inventory on the peninsula? Or, as noted, re-invade?
"Instead," writes Hodges, "Ukraine should fight to liberate Crimea." And he specifies precisely how Ukraine can accomplish this objective — without a manned invasion force. I quote:
"First, it should isolate Crimea with a combination of long-range precision weapons and armoured forces. Isolation requires disrupting and then severing the only two land lines of communication that connect Crimea to Russia: the Kerch Bridge and the land bridge from Rostov in Russia through Mariupol and Melitopol in Ukraine and into Crimea.
"Second, it should strike critical targets on the Crimean peninsula for months until it becomes untenable for Russian air, land and naval forces to remain stationed there. Precision strikes on Sevastopol, Dzhankoi and Saky will render these very vulnerable naval bases, logistics sites and airbases unusable for Russian forces."
If there's a hitch in Hodges' argument, it lies not in his reasoning. It lies in Washington. To achieve an unmanned, invasion-less triumph over Crimea, Ukraine would require weapons such as the Army Tactical Missile System, which, notes Hodges, "has a range of 300km (186 miles)." He also urges Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs — range, 150km, or 93 miles — which the US has approved since the general's op-ed writing. More effective ATACMS remain out of Ukraine's reach, however.
Hodges believes that were the West to free up what's militarily necessary for Crimea's liberation, Ukraine could conquer "by the end of August." Barring that, "Crimea will remain a sanctuary for Russian supplies and weaponry."
I suspect "the West" — meaning the White House — will ultimately approve shipments of ATACMS to Ukraine. This would comport with the long, grueling, agonizing pattern of Western military aid for the plucky defender: immovable positions of "no" to this and that in military hardware, followed ineluctably by incremental movements of yes. After ATACMS, most likely, will come fighter jets for Ukraine, another requisite element of kicking Russia back to its borders.
Concludes Hodges: "We’ve learned from this past year that Ukrainian precision can defeat Russian heft with appropriate weaponry and smart timing. The West should help with both." As he writes earlier in his piece, "So let’s get going." One hopes Washington is listening.