Foreign Policy submits the argument that it's more useful to ask how to prevent a war between the People's Republic of China and the United States, since the latter, most likely at a minimum, would lose two aircraft carriers, each with 5,000 servicemembers aboard, as many as 500 planes and, along with Taiwan, "suffer a horrendous rain of Chinese ballistic missiles." To U.S. submarines, China would lose its fleet off Taiwan's coast and watch most of its invasion force sink into the Strait.
The magazine ventures no victorious balance sheet, just the roughest of previews of a war's cost. But Foreign Policy's question — how to prevent such a massive conflagration in the first place — is one of diplomacy and politics, while ours is a military query. What follows is a survey of several informed opinions — necessarily opinions only, I should add, since no one, of course, has "the" answer.
One is offered by the nonpartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington-based think tank. It notes that a war would have more "nationalistic and emotional" appeal to the Chinese, thus the PRC would be likely to "[risk] more to achieve its ends." The U.S. would attempt to balance or outweigh China's natural, geopolitical advantages by enhancing its asymmetric tactics, for instance, by using "anti-access/area denial tactics against Chinese warships and interdict Chinese shipping."
The U.S. would pressure its allies to provide bases as well as forces in the region. But European involvement "seems unlikely," writes QIRS. "Even France and Great Britain, which possess Europe’s most substantial military forces, are ill-equipped to play a significant role in a Pacific conflict." More probable is they would agree to "impose economic sanctions, cooperate in cyberwarfare, apply diplomatic pressure, and offer logistical support."
The institute concludes that a U.S. defeat is possible, if not likely. It observes that recent U.S. wargames "have generally shown Beijing as the victor." And if not that, then an "indecisive and thus lengthy war." Meanwhile, Taiwan's industry would be "devastated," other countries precariously would be pressured to choose sides, and global commerce would be "[swept] ... from the seas."
If, however, the U.S. were to pull out a victory, continues the QIRS, it "would likely be only temporary." Because the Chinese would be unlikely to accept a permanent loss. "Geography, nationalism, and interest would impel a defeated PRC ... to reorganize and rearm for a future rematch." Would the U.S. persist in spending hundreds of billions a year "to guarantee not America’s safety, but perpetually police Asia thousands of miles away"? The question virtually answers itself.
Mostly unexamined in this post is what the QIRS says, understandably, is the greatest peril of Sino-U.S. hostilities: that of a nuclear war. Reiterates the institute: "No Chinese government could afford to lose, leaving Washington dominant along its border." But I, for one, continue to think that a nuclear conflict between superpowers is out of the question — as it is in the Russia-Ukraine war — since neither side is suicidal.
The Brookings Institution’s Michael O'Hanlon disagrees, arguing that "neither Beijing nor Washington would accept defeat in a limited engagement." Hence escalation from conventional warfare is a real possibility, with the conflict expanding "horizontally to other regions and vertically" — by which he means nuclear. "It literally could become the worst catastrophe in the history of warfare."
Returning to a conventional war scenario, the American Enterprise Institute is rather gloomy about a U.S. victory. Writes the institute with a stress on the political angle of a military conflict, it's rather implausible that the Chinese Communist Party, "always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy," would accept defeat. This, then, could pose a replay of modern military history, which the AEI characterizes as one of long rather than short wars.
Writing for Mind Matters, Robert Marks, of the Walter Bradley Center for Natural & Artificial Intelligence, leads off by quoting some U.S. brass. Says Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan, "I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight [China] in 2025." About that, says U.S. Army Gen. Jack Keane, we are underprepared: “China has more ships, more planes, and more missiles."
Marks writes that others are pessimistic about the U.S.'s chances of victory. Bryan Clark of the Hudson Institute notes that "Despite all the calls to boost production, the U.S. military will be short of key missiles for at least two years. It needs ways to win with what it has now." And Brandon Tseng, the co-founder of an AI firm, describes the U.S.'s technological preparedness for war "with some chilling similes": "China’s military is Netflix; the U.S. military is Blockbuster"; "China is Amazon; the U.S. is Barnes & Noble"; "China is Tesla; the U.S. is General Motors." I'm no authority on military technology, but I'll hazard that Mr. Tseng's similes are dramatically overblown.
Perhaps the most even-handed analysis comes from U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, writing for Nekkei Asia (in 2021). "I would say slight advantage China in terms of pure numbers of platforms both sea and air, with the U.S. having higher quality of assets. geographically and logistically."
Although China has "a great advantage" as a resident in the South and East China seas, the U.S. and its allies "are bigger, richer and have stronger militaries, so an advantage for Washington." But, warns Stavridis, "the gap is closing." Like Brandon Tseng, the admiral sees military technology as the "most important" factor. On this he writes: "In the key areas of undersea silencing of submarines, numbers of military satellites in space, offensive and defensive cyber tools and unmanned vehicles, the U.S. still has the lead. But China is closing fast, especially in artificial intelligence, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber and the emerging field of quantum computing."
Last we come to Adm. Stavridis's "Bottom line: If I were the admiral commanding the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — the leader for all American military forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans — I would still want the U.S. hand of cards to play. But as the Duke of Wellington said of the Battle of Waterloo, a fight with China would be a 'near-run thing.' And over the next decade, that gap will close and -- if the U.S. does not respond -- will favor China."
The one element to be kept in mind when reading assorted analyses of a Sino-U.S. war is what I'd call opinion-motivation, which others call a hidden agenda. And some are not so hidden. The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft has been criticized by neoconservatives, perhaps not unfairly, for being an isolationist throwback to the 1920s and '30s. The American Enterprise Institute desires more military spending. And techno-gurus always want fancier gadgets.
But as a retired admiral with a PhD and in law and diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University, James Stavridis is out of the war business. As such, his analysis seems properly detached from any personal motivations. I suppose his concluding remark — that the "gap will close ... if the U.S. does not respond" — could be read as a call for huge increases in military spending. I read it as nothing more than a dispassionate, objective summary.
Thus, if Gen. Minihan — "My gut tells me we will fight [China] in 2025," well into the gap-closing decade — is somewhere close to on-target, then Adm. Stavridis's summary becomes: The U.S. loses.